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International Commercial Arbitration:
Reflections at the Crossroads of the Common Law and
Civil Law Traditions
Javier H. Rubinstein*

The practice of international commercial arbitration, as its name suggests,
involves the resolution of disputes between parties located in different countries
and, in many cases, who come from vastly different cultures. As one might
expect, counsel to parties in international arbitrations and members of these
arbitral tribunals alike are commonly from different countries. Invariably, such
cases also bring together attorneys trained in the different legal traditions of the
common law and civil law.
International arbitration has existed for centuries as a form of dispute
resolution, but has increased dramatically since the passage of the 1958 New
York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of International Arbitral
Awards.' Until the past two decades, international arbitration was more wellknown in civil law countries, with less acceptance in the United States until after
the US ratification of the New York Convention in 1970. As parties and counsel
from the United States and United Kingdom have increasingly participated in
the international arbitral system, the system has evolved to incorporate elements
of both the civil and common law traditions.
As explained below, the rules and procedures that commonly apply today
in international arbitration reflect a mixture of common law and civil law norms;
the system also appears to be evolving more in a common law direction that
tends to favor counsel trained in the adversarial process. This essay is meant to
highlight just a few examples of this trend, each of which reflects a unique
intersection of these traditions.
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I. DISCOVERY
It is difficult to overstate the horror with which parties and counsel outside
the United States view the prospect of American-style discovery, with parties
able to serve upon one another sweeping requests for production of documents
and other information relevant to the litigation, and to obtain oral deposition
testimony of witnesses in advance of trial. In civil law countries, such discovery
is rarely permitted, and is viewed by many as an affront to the expectations of
privacy and confidentiality that private parties have in their business
information. Foreign parties doing business in the United States often insist on
arbitration clauses in their agreements precisely to avoid the prospect of
discovery and the other risks of litigation in the United States.
It should come as no surprise, then, that the topic of discovery is
frequently debated in international arbitral proceedings. Even ten years ago,
discovery (or "disclosure," as it is often termed in international arbitration), was
relatively uncommon in international arbitration. Today, however, a limited
amount of discovery is typically available, albeit under the strict control and
discretion of the arbitral tribunal. Under the rules of most international arbitral
institutions, such as the International Court of Arbitration of the International
Chamber of Commerce ("ICC"), the London Court of International Arbitration
("LCIA"), and the American Arbitration Association ("AAA"), the arbitral
tribunal is given the broad power to determine whether, and to what extent,
discovery will be permitted. For instance, the ICC Rules give the tribunal
authority to "establish the facts of the case by all appropriate means," and "may
summon any party to provide additional evidence. ' 2 Likewise, the LCIA and
AAA Rules explicitly authorize the arbitral tribunal to order the pre-hearing
production of documents
Although discovery is thus permitted to a certain extent, the scope of such
discovery is generally far more limited than would otherwise be available in the
United States, and more akin to the discovery process in the United Kingdom.
In the UK, parties may only seek disclosure of documents that can be identified
2
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with particularity and which the requesting party already has reason to believe
exist, thus avoiding the sorts of "fishing expeditions" commonly associated with
US-style discovery. This discovery model is exemplified in the model discovery
rules for international arbitration set forth in the International Bar Association's
1999 Rules on the Taking of Evidence in International Arbitration, which
specifically require that any request for production of documents contain:
(a) (i) a description of a requested document sufficient to identify it, or (ii)
a description in sufficient detail (including subject matter) of a narrow
and specific requested category of documents that are reasonably
believed to exist;
(b) a description of how the documents requested are relevant and
material to the outcome of the case; and
(c) a statement that the documents requested are not in the possession,
custody or control of the requesting Party, and of the reason why that
to be in the possession,
Party assumes the documents requested
4
Party.
other
the
of
control
or
custody
to note that the IBA Rules do not provide for any other
important
also
is
It
form of discovery, such as pre-hearing depositions of witnesses, the use of
written interrogatories, or requests for admissions, all of which are mainstays of
the discovery process under the US Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Such
forms of discovery are rarely, if ever, permitted in international arbitral
proceedings absent agreement of the parties.
The disclosure process in international arbitration thus strikes a careful
balance between the common law and civil traditions-a balance that, at least in
my experience, is somewhat alien to counsel trained in common law and civil
law systems alike. Non-US parties, as discussed below, are often quite surprised
at the prospect of having to produce confidential business documents,
particularly where such disclosure would never be ordered in domestic judicial
proceedings. US parties, on the other hand, complain that the discovery
requirements quoted above are difficult, if not impossible, to meet. After all,
they say, what good is a discovery process if you can only request documents
that you already know to exist? How can you describe documents you haven't
seen before? Despite such complaints, however, this process is today wellaccepted and quite successful.
It is still the case, however, that US counsel in international arbitration
proceedings are often viewed with a measure of suspicion at the outset, as
counsel from other countries presume an intent to engage in broad fishing
expeditions when, in fact, the truth is sometimes just the opposite. In many
arbitrations, I find that there is little need for discovery, and that limited
4
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document discovery alone will suffice. I also find that counsel and parties from
civil law countries, when given the opportunity to seek discovery, in some
instances are anxious to broaden the scope of discovery, recognizing the tactical
advantages it provides in putting together one's case. In any event, the
international arbitration system has come to reflect the recognition that limited
discovery does serve a valuable function in giving the parties a meaningful
opportunity to present their case, and in helping arbitral tribunals to evaluate the
parties' positions.
Although discovery is currently quite common in international arbitrations,
it is often a new experience for parties domiciled in civil law countries where
such discovery is not permitted under local law. For such parties, the discovery
process carries obvious risk. Companies in the United States are often
accustomed to the concept of discovery in the litigation process, and thus take
precautions in their everyday business affairs, such as being careful what they put
in writing, even in purely internal communications. For parties that have never
been required to produce documents to litigation adversaries, however, such
precautions are entirely alien, which leads inevitably to the risk that written
communications may be produced which the author never dreamed would
possibly make it into the hands of a litigation adversary. It is therefore vital that
parties who enter into international arbitral agreements begin taking the types of
precautions that US parties have long been accustomed to, taking care as to what
they reduce to writing, particularly when it comes to electronic mail that today is
becoming a more frequent target of discovery requests in international arbitral
proceedings, just as it has been in American litigation for many years.

II. PRIVILEGES AND TRIAL PREPARATION
The intersection of the common law and civil law traditions has also
brought into focus differing conceptions of the privileges that apply to
communications between an attorney and a client.' There are no established
rules to govern the nature or scope of the attorney-client privilege in
international arbitration. While the rules of some arbitral institutions authorize
the tribunal to order the production of all documents "not privileged," those
rules never specify which documents are "privileged" in the first place. This
silence is not surprising, since conceptions of the attorney-client privilege around
the world differ dramatically. For instance, in the United States, the privilege is
meant to foster candid communication between an attorney and a client by
providing that such communications cannot be discovered or offered into
evidence, including communications between in-house counsel and employees

5
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of organizational clients.6 The privilege is also considered a right which only the
client generally can waive. In civil law countries, however, the attorney-client
of the criminal laws and ethics rules to protect
privilege exists as a construct
"professional secrets." 7 The obligation to protect such secrets is both a right and
a duty of the lawyer and a matter of public order. As such, a client has no power
to waive the confidentiality that attaches to professional secrets between the
attorney and a client. It is the lawyer's exclusive province to determine what
constitutes a professional secret, and what can be divulged. Unlike the common
law rule, communications between in-house counsel and corporate employees
are generally not considered privileged.8
There is thus a great deal of uncertainty over what sorts of
communications between an attorney and a client are immune from discovery in
international arbitrations-uncertainty further compounded by the absence of
any established choice-of-law rules to determine which law will govern the
existence and scope of the privilege, and the extent to which the privilege can be
waived. This uncertainty has a significant impact on the process of trial
preparation and the presentation of evidence-a process that itself also
highlights another clear divide between the common law and civil law traditions.
It is generally accepted in common law jurisdictions that counsel can
interview and "prepare" their witnesses for the giving of testimony during
discovery and at trial, thus discussing the witness's testimony and the issues
likely to arise during their examination. In civil law countries, however, such
preparation of witnesses is often forbidden, and is regarded as nothing less than
witness tampering. In international arbitral proceedings, however, it is generally
permitted for counsel to speak with witnesses about the content of their
testimony, whether in preparing a witness's pre-hearing written testimony or in
preparing for the witness's oral testimony at the arbitral hearing. The obvious
concern arises, however, as to whether such communications between counsel
and witness would be subject to disclosure. While it is doubtful that many
arbitral tribunals would be willing to permit such questioning, the absence of any
established framework to govern the nature and scope of the attorney-client
privilege should give the practitioner a measure of pause at the prospect that
such communications could come to light.
III. THE PRESENTATION OF EVIDENCE
Perhaps the most fundamental difference between the common law and
civil law modes of dispute resolution lies in the manner in which evidence is
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presented to the finder of fact. In the common law tradition, testimony is
presented to the finder of fact principally through live oral testimony of
witnesses, rather than in written form. While written declarations are permissible
in certain pre-trial settings, such declarations cannot generally be offered at trial
in lieu of oral testimony, for they are considered inadmissible hearsay.9 The
questioning of witnesses is also conducted by counsel for the parties, with each
party having the right to have their counsel cross-examine witnesses directly in
the presence of the finder of fact.
In the civil law tradition, by contrast, evidence and testimony generally is
presented to the finder of fact principally in written form. While live testimony
may be taken, the questioning of witnesses is conducted not by counsel, but
rather by the court, which retains the sole authority to determine which
questions will be put to the witness. Direct, adversarial cross-examination of
witnesses by counsel is not permitted.
The current standard practice in international arbitral proceedings, once
again, seeks to strike a balance between the common law and civil law traditions,
albeit one in which the balance tips decidedly in favor of the common law
model. Witness testimony is generally presented in the first instance through
written witness statements, although the content of such witness statements
depends heavily on the requirements imposed by the particular arbitral tribunal
in each case. In some instances, the arbitral tribunal will require that the written
witness statements serve as a complete substitute for the witness's direct
testimony at trial, with oral examination at trial commencing with crossexamination conducted by opposing counsel. In other instances, the arbitral
tribunal will require that the written witness statement provide only a general
overview of the witness's testimony, with the witness able to supplement their
testimony with direct examination by counsel at the hearing. In any event, the
heavy use of written evidence in international arbitration reflects the distinct
influence of the civil law tradition.
However, it is also generally well-established in international arbitration
that any witness presented by a party must be made available to testify live
before the arbitral tribunal, with the opportunity for the opposing party to crossexamine the witness. This procedure again is outlined in the IBA Rules, which
provide that:
The Claimant shall ordinarily first present the testimony of its witnesses,
followed by the Respondent presenting testimony of its witnesses, and then
by the presentation by Claimant of rebuttal witnesses, if any. Following
direct testimony, any other Party may question such witness, in an order to
be determined by the Arbitral Tribunal. The Party who initially presented
the witness shall subsequendy have the opportunity to ask additional

9
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questions on the matters raised in the other Parties' questioning.. . . The
Arbitral Tribunal may ask questions to a witness at any time.' 0
The presentation of live witness testimony, and particularly the concept of
adversarial cross-examination of opposing witnesses, clearly is drawn from the
common law approach, and is often one of the greatest sources of consternation
for civil law-trained counsel. This concern is understandable since such crossexamination is rarely, if ever, permitted in their domestic courts. Effective crossexamination requires extensive training and practice-neither of which civil law
lawyers are likely to receive in their traditional legal training or in their everyday
domestic litigation practice. As such, common law attorneys from the United
States and the United Kingdom are generally at a competitive advantage because
of their everyday familiarity with adversarial cross-examination in their domestic
courts.
Cross-examination in international arbitration, however, raises unique
challenges even for the common law-trained attorney. Such counsel are
accustomed to relying in domestic litigation on the use of oral depositions to
understand the testimony that a witness would give at trial before the trial itself
takes place. Armed with such testimony, counsel have a measure of confidence
in knowing what a witness will say when asked particular questions at trial. If the
witness testifies in a manner inconsistent with their pre-trial testimony, the
witness can be impeached on the basis of such inconsistent statements. As
mentioned above, however, oral depositions are rarely, if ever, permitted in
international arbitration. Moreover, the level of detail that one sees in written
witness statements varies significantly, sometimes being nothing more than a
general description of the subjects that the witness will address at the arbitral
hearing. Since document discovery is generally quite limited, it is also possible
that there will not be many documentary exhibits to control the crossexamination. These, however, are the essential tools that American counsel
typically rely upon to conduct and control their cross-examinations. In any
event, it is apparent that skill and care are required for counsel conducting the
sorts of "blind" cross-examinations that commonly occur in international
arbitration, where counsel often have little assurance of knowing what a witness
will say during the course of an examination.
Disputes also occasionally arise as to whether counsel should be given the
opportunity to present oral arguments to the arbitral tribunal, whether in the
form of opening statements at the outset of an arbitral hearing, or through
closing arguments after the evidence has been presented. These too are creatures
of the common law world, and relatively unknown in civil law litigation. As
indicated above, the common law tradition relies more heavily on the use of oral
presentation of evidence and argument to the finder of fact. And once again,
10 IBA Rule Evid art 8(2) (cited in note 4).

Summer 2004

ChicagoJournalof InternationalLaw

that tradition has largely prevailed, for such use of oral argument is common in
international arbitration.
IV. THE NEW FRONTIER
The challenge of international arbitration, and litigating at the crossroads of
the common law and civil law traditions, ultimately lies in the opportunity it
affords to counsel in each and every case to fashion procedural rules that best
suit the particular proceeding and will serve the client's interest. Unlike the rules
of domestic litigation that are immutable and well-understood, the procedures
that govern international arbitration depend entirely on the choices of the
counsel who represent the parties and those who serve on the arbitral tribunal.
Accordingly, no two arbitrations will ever be conducted in exactly the same
way-nor should they be, for the best rules and procedures are those that
properly reflect the needs of the parties based on the particular facts and
circumstances of the dispute at hand.
The frameworks that generally govern international arbitrations, whether
they be ad hoc arbitrations governed by the Rules of Arbitration of the United
Nations Commission on International Trade Law ("UNCITRAL"), or by the
rules of institutions such as the ICC, LCIA or AAA, consistently promote this
flexibility in arbitration first by acknowledging the ultimate power of the parties
to control the arbitral process through the terms of the arbitration agreements
that give rise to the arbitral process in the first place, and then by giving arbitral
tribunals great latitude (within the parameters of the arbitration agreement) to
decide how the arbitration should be conducted, subject also to broadly stated
requirements of fairness.
These opportunities demand that counsel, regardless of where they have
been trained, be open to the advantages offered by the procedural models of
other legal systems. In my case, as counsel trained in the United States, it has
required that I be open to the benefits of civil law procedures, including, among
other things, greater reliance on written presentation of proof, and more limited
use of discovery. It is possible, although unlikely, that someday there will exist a
set of universal procedural rules to govern international arbitrations, much like
the rules of civil procedure that govern domestic litigation. In the meantime,
though, the field of international arbitration will remain a new frontier,
continually evolving at the crossroads of the common law and civil law
traditions.
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